

Al-Ghazālī

**The Incoherence
of the Philosophers**

تهافت الفلاسفة

*A parallel English–Arabic text
translated, introduced, and annotated by*

Michael E. Marmura

[Eighteenth] Discussion

On their inability to sustain a rational demonstration [proving] that the human soul is a self-subsistent spiritual substance that does not occupy space; that it is neither body nor imprinted in the body; that it is neither connected with nor disconnected from the body, just as God is neither outside nor inside the world, the same being the case with the angels, according to them

(1) To plunge into this requires explaining their doctrine of the animal and human [psychological] faculties.

(2) The animal faculties, according to [the philosophers], divide into two parts: motive and apprehending. The apprehending consists of two
5 parts: external and internal. The external consists of the five senses, which are meanings imprinted in bodies—I mean these faculties. As for the internal, they are three. One of them is the imaginative faculty [located] in the front of the brain, behind the faculty of sight. In it, the forms of seen things are retained after closing the eye; indeed, there is
10 imprinted in it what all the five senses bring in. These assemble therein, and for this reason it is [then] termed “the common sense.” If it were not for [this common sense], then if someone who had seen white honey and [in the past] had not apprehended its sweetness except through taste were to see it again, he would not apprehend its sweetness unless he
15 tasted [it] as he did the first time. But [the common sense] includes¹ a meaning that judges that this white thing is the sweet thing. Hence, it is

inevitable that he have with him a judge where the two things—I mean color and sweetness—have been assembled, such that with the existence of the one he judges that the other exists.

5 (3) The second is the estimative faculty,² which apprehends meanings, whereas the first faculty apprehends the forms. By “form” one
 10 intends that whose existence requires matter—that is, a body—and by “meanings” that whose existence does not require a body but which happens to be in a body—as, for example, enmity and harmony. Thus, the ewe apprehends of the wolf its color, shape, and appearance, which can
 15 only exist in a body, but she also apprehends its being disagreeable to her. [Again,] the kid apprehends the color and shape of the mother, then it apprehends her harmony and agreeableness. For this reason it flees from the wolf and runs after the mother. Unlike color and shape, it is not a necessity for disagreeableness and agreeableness to be in bodies; but it so
 20 happens that they also exist in bodies. Hence, this [imaginative] faculty differs from the second faculty [the estimative]. The place of this [latter] faculty is the hindmost concavity of the brain.

(4) As regards the third [inner sense], this is the faculty which in
 25 animals is called the imaginative and in humans the cogitative. Its task is to combine the sensible forms with each other and to construct meanings over forms. It is in the middle concavity of the brain, between that which retains the forms and that which retains the meanings. For this reason the human can imagine a horse that flies, [or] an individual whose head is the head of a man and whose body is the body of a horse, or other compositions [of this sort], even though the likes of these have never been
 30 seen. It is more appropriate that this faculty should be attached to the motive faculty, as will be discussed shortly, [and] not with the apprehending faculties. The place of these faculties is known through the medical art. For when a malady afflicts any of these concavities, these [apprehending] things become defective.

(5) They then claimed that the faculty in which the forms of the sensible things experienced by the five senses are impressed retains these forms so that they endure after [their] reception. A thing does not retain [another] thing by the [same] faculty by which it receives it. For water
 35 receives but does not retain, whereas wax receives through its moistness and retains through its dryness, unlike water. Thus, the retentive [faculty]

through this consideration becomes other than the receptive. Hence, this [latter faculty] is termed “the retentive.” The same applies to meanings. [These] are impressed on the estimative [faculty], and a faculty termed “memory” retains them. Thus, the internal apprehensions through this
 5 consideration, when the imaginative is added to them, become five, just as the external [senses] are five.

(6) Regarding the motive faculties, they divide into a motive [faculty] in the sense that it motivates toward movement and into a motive [faculty] in the sense that it initiates the movement, enacting [it].

10 (7) The motive in the sense that it motivates is the appetitive, desirous [faculty]. This is the one which, when the form of the object of either desire or aversion is imprinted in the imaginative faculty which we have mentioned, impels the active motive faculty into motion. It has two branches: a branch termed “the concupiscent,” a faculty that impels
 15 toward motion through which one is drawn near to the things imagined, whether necessary or useful, in the quest of pleasure; and a branch termed “irascible”—namely, a faculty that impels toward motion that repels the imagined thing, whether harmful or destructive, seeking to overcome [it]. With this faculty is fulfilled the complete resolution to
 20 [perform] the act termed “voluntary.”

(8) As regards the motive faculty, in the sense that it enacts [movement], it is a power that is imprinted in the nerves and muscles whose function is to contract the muscles, pulling thereby the sinews and tendons that are connected with the limbs to the direction wherein is the power,
 25 or else to relax and stretch them lengthwise so that the sinews and tendons move in the opposite direction. These, then, are the faculties of the animal soul [described] by way of brevity and the abandoning of detail.

(9) Regarding the rational human soul, called by them “the discursive”—by “discursive” being meant “rational” (because discourse is externally the most particular of the fruits of reason and is hence attributed to it)—it has two faculties, a cognitive faculty and a practical faculty. Each
 30 of the two may be called an “intellect,” but equivocally. The practical is a

5 faculty which is a principle that moves the body of man toward the ordered human arts whose order is drawn out by deliberation, [the activity] proper to man. As for the cognitive, this is the one termed “theoretical.” This is a faculty whose function is to apprehend the true natures of the
 10 the intelligibles stripped from matter, place, and [spatial] direction. These are the universal propositions³ which the speculative theologians call “states” at one time [and] “aspects” at another, and which the philosophers call “abstract universals.”

10 (10) Hence, the soul has two faculties in relation to two sides: the theoretical faculty in relation to the side of the angels, since through it [the soul] takes from the angels the true sciences—and this faculty ought to be constantly [open to] reception from the side above; and the practical faculty, which belongs to [the soul] in relation to what is below—namely, the direction of the body to its management and the rectification
 15 of moral dispositions. This is a faculty that ought to take control over all the rest of the bodily faculties, whereby the rest of the faculties would be disciplined by its educative action [and be] vanquished by it, so that it is not influenced by [the bodily faculties], but, rather, that these faculties [themselves] are influenced by it—[this] lest there occur in the soul by
 20 way of bodily qualities submissive dispositions called vices. Rather, [this practical faculty ought] to be dominant so that because of it there would be realized for the soul dispositions called virtues.

25 (11) This, in brief, is what they have detailed regarding the animal and human faculties, going to great length in mentioning them, abandoning any discussion of the vegetative powers, since talking about them is not to our purpose. There is nothing in what they have mentioned that must be denied in terms of the religious law. For these are observed matters which God has ordained to flow according to habit.⁴

30 (12) We only want now to object to their claim of their knowing through rational demonstrations that the soul is a self-subsistent substance. We do not offer against [their claim] the objection of one who deems this remote from God’s power or who perceives that the religious law has brought forth what is contrary to it. Indeed, we may well show in detailing the explanation of the resurrection and the afterlife that the
 35 law gives credence to it. We deny, however, their claim that reason alone

indicates this and that there is no need in it for the religious law. Let us, then, demand of them proofs. They have for this many demonstrations, as they claim.

The first [proof]⁵

(13) They say:

5 (14) Intellectual cognitions indwell in the human soul, being restricted [in number], and include units that are indivisible. It is inevitable, therefore, that their receptacle is also indivisible. [Now,] every body is divisible. [This] proves that their receptacle is something that is indivisible. One
10 can formulate this according to the condition of logic in its [various] figures, but the easiest [to grasp] is to say: "If the receptacle of knowledge is a divisible body, knowledge that indwells therein is also divisible; but the knowledge indwelling therein is not divisible; the receptacle, hence, is not a body." This is a hypothetical syllogism in which the contradictory of the consequent is given as a second statement,⁶ deriving thereby
15 as the conclusion the contradictory of the antecedent, by agreement.⁷ There is, hence, no need to examine the correctness of the figure of the syllogism, nor also [the truth] of the two premises. For the first [consists of] our statement that everything that indwells in what is divisible becomes necessarily divisible by the [very] supposition of divisibility in its
20 receptacle. This is a primary [truth] that cannot be doubted. The second is our statement that the one knowledge indwells in the human and is indivisible. For if it were divisible infinitely, this would be impossible; and if it were to have a limit, then it would necessarily include unities that are indivisible. In brief, we know things but cannot suppose that some
25 [of the things in our knowledge] cease while some remain, since there is no "some" in these [things].

(15) The objection is from two standpoints.

(16) The first standpoint is to say: "With what [argument] would you deny one who says, 'The receptacle for knowledge is single, indivisible, space-occupying substance?'" This is known from the doctrine of the speculative theologians. The only response that remains [for the philosophers]

30

is to deem [this doctrine] unlikely—namely [to ask] “How is it that all the cognitions would dwell in a single [indivisible] substance, all the substances surrounding [these cognitions] being deprived [of them while yet] close by?” But deeming something unlikely [does the philosophers]

5 no good, since it [can] also be turned against their doctrine. [For one can ask:] “How can the soul be one thing that does not occupy space, is not referred to by pointing, is neither in the body nor outside it, is neither connected with the body nor disconnected [from it]?” We, however, will not favor this position [here]. For the discussion of the question of the

10 indivisible part is lengthy, and [the philosophers] have concerning it geometrical proofs that would take long to discuss. These include their statement: “In the case of an individual atom between two atoms, would one of its ends meet an identical thing that the other end meets, or something else? If an identical thing, this would be impossible. For from this

15 it follows necessarily that the two ends [of the atom] meet, since whatever meets that which meets another meets the former. If what [either end] meets is another [thing], then this entails affirming multiplicity and division.”⁸ This is a difficulty that will take long to resolve, and we have no need to get involved in it; so let us, hence, turn to another position.

20 (17) The second standpoint is to say: “What you have mentioned to the effect that everything that indwells in a body must be divisible is falsified for you in terms of what the [estimative] faculty that is in the ewe apprehends of the wolf’s enmity. For it is within the domain of one thing whose division is inconceivable, since enmity does not have a part

25 where one [could] hypothesize the apprehension of some part of it and the ceasing to exist of another part. But, according to you, [the ewe’s] apprehension [of the enmity] took place in a bodily faculty.” For the soul of beasts is imprinted in bodies, not enduring after death. This they agree on. If, then, they are able to undertake the supposition of division

30 in the things apprehended by the five senses, the common sense, and the faculty retentive of [material] forms, they are unable to suppose division in these meanings that do not have as a condition their being in matter.

(18) If it is said, "The ewe does not apprehend absolute enmity, stripped from matter, but apprehends the enmity of the determinate, individuated wolf, connected with its individual [self] and frame, whereas the rational faculty apprehends truths abstracted from materials and individuals," we say:

(19) The ewe has apprehended the color of the wolf, its shape, and then its enmity. If the color is imprinted in the faculty of sight, [and] similarly shape, [both] being divisible by the divisibility of the receptacle of sight, with what, then, does [the ewe] apprehend the enmity? If it is apprehended by a body, then let it be divisible. But, by my word, what would be the state of that apprehension if it is divisible, and how would part of it be? Would this be apprehension of "some" of the enmity? If so, how would it have a part? Or would it be that each part is an apprehension of the whole of the enmity, whereby enmity would be known several times by having its apprehension being fixed in each part of the parts of the receptacle? This, then, [remains] a difficulty in their demonstration unresolved for them. It is in dire need of a solution.

(20) [To this it may] be said:

(21) This is a contradiction [you bring] into [the things that are] rationally intelligible, and intelligible things cannot be contradicted. For as long as you are unable to doubt the two premises—namely, that the one knowledge is indivisible and that whatever is indivisible does not subsist in a divisible body—you cannot doubt the conclusion.

(22) The answer is that we have written this book only to show the incoherence and inconsistency in the utterances of the philosophers. This has been achieved, since one of the two things has been contradicted—either what they have said about the rational soul or what they have said about the estimative faculty. Moreover, this contradiction shows that they did not notice a place of confusion in [their] syllogism. Perhaps the place of confusion lies in their statement: "Knowledge is imprinted in the body in the way color is imprinted in the colored thing, and color is divided by the division of the thing colored. Knowledge is hence divided by the division of the receptacle." The defect [here] is in the expression "being imprinted," since it is possible that the relation of knowledge to its

receptacle is unlike the relation of color to the thing colored [where, if it were similar,] one would consequently say that it covers it, is impressed in it, and is spread over its sides, and is thus divided by its division. Perhaps the relation of knowledge to its receptacle is of a different aspect, that aspect not allowing the division [of knowledge] with the division of the receptacle. Rather, its relation may well be similar to the relation of enmity to the body. The aspects of the relation of qualities to their receptacles are not confined to one mode, nor are their details known to us in a manner in which we are [fully] confident. Hence, judging it without wholly comprehending the details of the relation would constitute an unreliable judgment.

(23) In general, one does not deny that what they have mentioned is among those things that strengthen belief, making it more likely. But what is denied is its being known with certainty, by a knowledge in which error is not allowed and which doubt does not frequent. This much [of what they say, however,] is open to doubt.

A second proof

(24) They say:

(25) If knowledge of the one intellectual object of knowledge—namely, the object of knowledge that is abstracted from material things—is imprinted in matter in the way accidents are imprinted in bodily substances, then, as previously noted, its division by virtue of the division of the body follows necessarily. If it is not imprinted in [matter] nor spread over it, and the utterance “imprinting” is found repugnant, we will exchange it for another expression, saying: “Does knowledge have or does it not have a relation to the knower?”⁹ It is impossible to sever the relation. For if the relation is severed from it, then why should his being cognizant of [the object of knowledge] have preference over another [person’s] being cognizant of it? If [knowledge] has a relation, then [one of] three alternatives is not excluded: either [(a)] the relation exists for each [one] of the parts of the receptacle, [or (b) it exists] for [only] some parts of the receptacle, or [(c)] no one part of the receptacle has a relation to [knowledge].

(26) [Now,] it is false to say that there is no relation to any one unit of the parts [of the receptacle]. For if the units have no relation, the whole would have no relation. For the compound of things separated [from an entity] is [itself] separated [from that entity]. And it is [also] false to say that the relation is [only] to some parts [of the receptacle]. For that which has no relation does not in any way [share] in the meaning ["knowledge"]. And our discussion would not pertain to it. It is, furthermore, false to say that each part which is supposed has a relation to the essence [of what is known]. For if the relation pertains to the essence of knowledge in its entirety, then what is known in each part is not restricted to a part of what is known, but to the known as [a whole]. Hence, what is known becomes known through instances that are infinite in actuality.¹⁰ If [on the other hand] each part of [the receptacle] has a relation other than the relation which another part has to the essence of knowledge, then the essence of knowledge is divisible in meaning. But we have shown that knowledge of the one object of knowledge in all [its] aspects is not divisible in meaning. And if the relation of each [part of the receptacle] to some [part] of the essence of knowledge is other than another part's relation to it, then the division of the essence of knowledge becomes in this way even more apparent. [But] this [division] is impossible.

(27) From this it becomes clear that the sensible things imprinted in the five senses can only be representations of particular divisible forms. For apprehension means the occurrence of the representation of what is apprehended in the soul of the one who apprehends. Each part of the representation of the perceived would then have a relation to a part of the bodily organ.

(28) [Our] objection [to this] is the same as [our] previous one. For replacing the expression "imprinting" by the expression "relation" does not resolve the difficulty in the case of what is imprinted in the ewe's estimative faculty of the wolf's enmity, according to what [the philosophers] have mentioned. For this is inescapably an apprehension and has a relation to [the knower], and the things you have mentioned obtain necessarily for this relation. Enmity is not something measurable, having a measurable quantity such that its representation would be imprinted in a quantified body, its parts becoming related to its parts. The shape of the wolf being measurable is not sufficient [to resolve the difficulty]. For the ewe apprehends something other than [the wolf's] shape—namely, contrariety, opposition, and enmity. What is added to shape by

way of enmity has no measure; but the ewe has apprehended it by means of a quantified body. This form is [also] doubtful in this demonstration, as in the case of the first.

5 (29) If one were then to say, "Why did you not refute these demonstrations by [arguing] that knowledge indwells in the body in a substance occupying space that is indivisible—namely, the single atom?"¹¹ we would say:

10 (30) This is because discussing the single atom is connected with geometrical matters, the discussion of whose resolution takes too long. Moreover, this does not resolve the difficulty. For it would follow that power and will would have to exist in this atom. The human has action, and this is inconceivable without power and will, and will is conceivable only with knowledge. [Now,] the power to write exists in the hand and the fingers, whereas knowledge of [writing] is not in the hand, since it
15 does not cease with the severing of the hand. Nor is the will [to write] in the hand. For a person may will [to write] after a hand's paralysis, but it is inaccessible to him, not for lack of will, but for lack of power.

A third proof

20 (31) They say: "If knowledge were to be in a part of the body, then the knower would be that part, not the rest of the parts of the human. But the human is said to be a knower. The state of being a knower is an attribute belonging to him as a whole, without relating to a specific place."

(32) [We answer:] "This is madness. For one is called a seer, a hearer, and a taster, the beast also being described this way; but this does not indicate that the apprehension of sensible things is not by the
25 body." This is a kind of metaphorical speech, in the [same] way [that] it is said that "So-and-so is in Baghdad," even though he is in part of the totality of Baghdad, not in all of it; but he is made to relate to the whole.

A fourth proof

(33) If knowledge were to reside in a part of the heart or the brain, for example, ignorance being its opposite, it ought then to be possible for it to subsist in another part of the heart or brain. Man, then, would be at one and the same time both knowing and ignorant of one thing. This
 5 being impossible, it becomes evident that the receptacle of ignorance is the receptacle of knowledge and that this receptacle is one, wherein it is impossible for the two opposites to combine. For, if it were divisible, it would not be impossible for ignorance to reside in one part [and]
 10 knowledge in another. For a thing in a place is not contradicted by its opposite in another place, just as being piebald is an attribute of the one horse and blackness and whiteness of the one eye, but in different places.

(34) This does not necessarily follow in the case of the senses. For there are no contraries to their apprehension; rather, [the sense] will either apprehend or not apprehend. There is nothing between them
 15 except the opposition of existence or nonexistence. No wonder, then, that we say, "He apprehends by some of his parts, such as the eye or the ear, but does not apprehend by the rest of his body." In this there is no contradiction.

(35) This is not dispensed with by your statement, "The state of being a knower is contrary to the state of being ignorant, the judgment being general, applying to the entire body," since it is impossible for the judgment to pertain to other than the receptacle of the cause. For the knower is the receptacle in which knowledge subsists. If the term is applied to the whole, this is only by way of metaphor, just as one would
 20 say, "He is in Baghdad," even though he is only in part of it; and just as it is said, "He has sight," when we necessarily know that the judgment of seeing is inapplicable to the foot and the hand but pertains specifically to the eye. The opposition of judgments is similar to the opposition of [their] causes. For the judgments are confined to the receptacle of the
 25 causes [of these judgments].
 30

(36) Nor is there an escape from this in someone's saying, "The receptacle prepared for the reception of knowledge and ignorance in a human is one [and the same], and, hence, they would be in opposition in it." For,

according to you, every body that is animate is receptive of knowledge and ignorance; and you made no condition other than life [for this reception]. The remaining parts of the body, according to you, with respect to the reception of knowledge, are of one pattern.

- 5 (37) [Our] objection is that this is turned against you with respect to appetite, desire, and will. For these matters are affirmed for beasts and man, being ideas impressed in the body. It is impossible to be repelled by what one desires. For then repulsion and inclination for one thing would combine in [the individual], desire existing in one receptacle, 10 repulsion in another receptacle. This does not prove that these two do not reside in bodies. This is because these faculties, although numerous, distributed among many organs, have one connecting link—namely, the soul. This holds for both man and beast. Once this link is unified, contradictory relations with respect to it become impossible. But this does 15 not prove that the soul is not imprinted in the body as it is [imprinted] in the case of beasts.

A fifth proof

(38) They say:

- (39) If the mind apprehends the intelligibles by a bodily organ, then it does not apprehend itself.¹² But the consequent is impossible. For [the 20 mind] apprehends itself. The antecedent, hence, is impossible.

(40) We say:

- (41) It is admitted that repeating the consequent, [but] in its contradictory form, gives as its conclusion the contradictory of the antecedent. But this is only the case if the necessary [relation] between the consequent and the antecedent is established. Rather, we say, “What renders the 25 necessity of the consequence admissible, and what proof is there for it?”

(42) [To this they may] say:

(43) The proof for it is that, since seeing is by means of a body, seeing is not connected with sight [as its object of seeing]. For seeing is not seen and hearing is not heard, the same being the case with the rest of the senses. If, then, mind apprehends only through a body, then it would not apprehend itself. For just as the mind apprehends intellectually what is other, it apprehends itself. For just as the one among us intellectually apprehends another, he apprehends himself and apprehends intellectually that he apprehends another and that he has intellectually apprehended himself.

10 (44) We say:

(45) What you have stated is false in two respects. One is that, for us, it is possible for sight to be related to itself so that it would consist in the seeing of another and of itself, in the same way that the one knowledge is knowledge of another and of itself. The habitual [course of nature], however, runs contrary to this. But the disruption of the habitual courses [of nature], according to us, is possible. The second—and this is the stronger [answer]—is for us to admit this with respect to [some of] the senses. But why should it be the case that, if this is impossible in some of the senses, it is impossible in others? And why is it unlikely that what governs the senses with respect to apprehension should differ, while [the senses] yet share in being bodily? [This is] just as sight and touch differ, in that touch does not yield apprehension except through the contact of the tangible with the organ of touch, the same being true of smell, whereas sight differs [from these]. For it is a condition [of sight] that it should be separated from [the object of sight]—so [much so] that when an individual closes his eyelids he does not see the color of the eyelid, because it is not at a distance from him. This difference [between sight and touch] does not necessitate a difference in the need for a body. Hence, it is not unlikely that there would be among the bodily senses that which is called mind, differing from the rest in that [these] do not apprehend themselves.

15
20
25
30

A sixth proof

(46) They say:

(47) If the mind were to apprehend by a bodily organ, as with sight, it would not have apprehended its organ, as with the rest of the senses. But it apprehends the brain and the heart and what is claimed to be its organ. This proves that [the object of its apprehension]¹³ is for [the mind] neither an organ nor a receptacle. Otherwise, it would not have apprehended it.

(48) [Our] objection to this [argument] is similar to the objection [to the argument] that preceded it. For we say, "It is not improbable for sight to perceive its receptacle, but [this] would be a reversion away from the habitual [course of events]"; or else we can say: "Why is it impossible for the senses to differ from each other in this respect, even though, as previously mentioned, they share in being imprinted in bodies? And why do you say that what subsists in a body cannot apprehend the body which is its receptacle, when it is not necessary to make an unrestricted universal judgment based on a determinate particular?" One of the things whose falsity is agreed on and which has been stated in logic is to make a universal judgment based on a particular cause or on numerous particulars, so that [the logicians] have illustrated it by the hypothetical example of a man who states: "Every animal moves its lower jaw in chewing, because we have examined inductively all the animals, observing them to be such," [the logicians adding that he makes this error] "because of his being oblivious of the crocodile; for it moves its upper jaw." [Now,] these [philosophers] have examined inductively only the five senses, finding them to be of a known mode, and on this basis they have made a judgment on all. For the mind may well be another sense that stands in relation to the other senses, as the crocodile stands in relation to the rest of the animals. The senses, although bodily, would then be divided into those that apprehend their receptacle and those that do not, just as they divide into those, like sight, that apprehend their object without contact and those, like touch and smell, that can only apprehend through contact. Hence, if what they have also stated may bequeath opinion, it does not yield reliable certitude.

(49) [The philosophers, however, may] say:

(50) We do not rely solely on the inductive examination of the senses. Rather, we rely on demonstration and say:

(51) If either the heart or the brain were to constitute man's soul, then their apprehension would never escape him, such that he is never without the intellectual apprehension of both, just as he is never without
 5 apprehension of himself. For no one escapes knowing himself, but is ever affirming within himself [the existence] of his self.¹⁴ But unless the human hears what is said about the heart and the brain, or sees them through dissection in another human, he will neither apprehend them
 10 nor believe in their existence. If mind, then, indwells in a body, it should intellectually apprehend that body permanently or not apprehend it ever. But neither of these alternatives is true. Rather, it apprehends [the body] at one time, and it does not apprehend [it] at another [time]. And this is the verification [of this]—namely, that the apprehension indwelling
 15 in the receptacle apprehends the receptacle only because of a relation it has to the receptacle. [Now,] it is inconceivable that it would have any relation to it other than that of indwelling in it. Let it, then, apprehend it always; and should this relation be insufficient, it ought not to apprehend it ever, since it can have no other relation to it. [This is] just as, in
 20 intellectually apprehending itself, it always apprehends itself, at no time being oblivious of it[self].

(52) [To this] we say:

(53) As long as man is aware of his self and is not inattentive to it, he is [merely] aware of his corpse and body. Yes, the name, form, and shape of
 25 the heart are not specifically determined for him; nonetheless, he affirms himself as a body such that he affirms himself to be in his garments and in his house, whereas the soul which [the philosophers] mention has no relation to the garment or the house.¹⁵ His affirmation of the basis of body [in self-awareness] is constantly with him, while his unawareness of his
 30 [heart's] shape and name is akin to his unawareness of the place of smell—that it consists of two appendages at the front of the brain, similar to the nipples of the breast. For every human knows that he apprehends smell with his body; but the place of apprehension does not take shape for him and is not specified, even though he apprehends that it is closer to the

head than to the foot and that, within the head, it is closer to the interior of the nose than it is to the interior of the ear. Similarly, man is aware of himself and knows that his haecceity through which he subsists is closer to his heart and chest than it is to his foot. For he can suppose himself to
 5 continue to exist without a foot but cannot suppose himself to survive with the nonexistence of the heart. Thus, what [the philosophers] state regarding [man's] being at one time unaware of his body and at another time aware is not the case.

A seventh proof

(54) They say:

10 (55) The faculties that apprehend through bodily organs undergo fatigue due to constant work through the continuing of apprehension.¹⁶ For the continuity of motion corrupts the temperaments of bodies, fatiguing them. Similarly, strong things whose apprehension is clear weaken [these faculties] and perhaps corrupt them such that they are
 15 unable to apprehend their successively dimmer and weaker objects of apprehension—as, for example, [what] the loud sound does to hearing and great light to seeing. For they often corrupt [the faculty] or prevent the apprehension of a successive faint sound and dim objects of sight. Indeed, whoever tastes what is intensely sweet does not sense thereafter
 20 a lesser sweetness.

(56) The case is the opposite with the intellectual faculty. For its rendering continual its [act of] viewing the intelligibles does not tire it, and the apprehension of clear necessary truths renders its apprehension of hidden theoretical matters stronger, not weaker. If at times it under-
 25 goes fatigue, this is due to its utilizing the service and help of the imaginative faculty, the organ of the imaginative faculty becoming weak and hence failing to serve the intellect.

(57) [Our answer] is that this is of the same pattern as the previous one. For we say:

¹⁶ *De anima*, 2.11, 425a25–b10. See also *De anima*, 2.12, 426a1–10.

(58) It is not improbable that the bodily senses should differ in these matters. For what holds for some need not necessarily hold for others. Rather, it is not improbable for bodies to differ such that some are weakened by one kind of movement while others are strengthened, not weakened, by [the same] kind of movement. Should [a kind of motion] affect [the bodily sense adversely], a cause that renews its strength would [arise] so that it does not experience the effect. All this is possible, since the judgment that holds for some things need not necessarily hold for all.

An eighth proof

(59) They say:

10 (60) The powers of all parts of the body weaken at the end of growth as one reaches the age of forty or thereafter. Sight, hearing, and the rest of the faculties thus weaken, whereas the rational faculty in most cases becomes stronger after this. The inability to reflect on the intelligibles when bodily illness and senility due to old age take place is not a necessary consequence [contradicting this]. For, as long as it is evident that 15 [the intellect] becomes stronger as the body weakens in some instances, it becomes clear that it subsists by itself. Hence, its dysfunction when the body ceases to function does not necessitate its being subsistent in a body. For the repetition of the very consequent in a [hypothetical syllogism] 20 does not yield a valid conclusion. For we say: "If the rational faculty subsists in a body, then the weakness of the body would in every case weaken it. But the consequent is impossible; hence, the antecedent is impossible." And if we say that the consequent exists in some instances, it does not follow that the antecedent exists.

25 (61) The reason for this is that the soul has an action by itself when no obstacle impedes it and nothing distracts it. For the soul has two actions: an action in relation to the body (namely, its leading and governing it) and an action in relation to its principles and itself (namely, apprehending the intelligibles). These two are contradictory [and] irreconcilable, so that

whenever [the intellect] is occupied with one, it leaves the other, combining the two becoming not possible for it. The bodily things that preoccupy it consist of sensation, imagination, [various] appetites, anger, fear, depression, and pain. Thus, when you start to think about an intelligible, all these things render¹⁷ [your thought] dysfunctional. Indeed, sensation alone may well prevent the apprehension and reflection of the mind, without [this] in any way affecting the intellectual faculty or having its essence afflicted by some malady. The reason in all this is the soul's preoccupation with one act, [distracting it] from another act. For this reason the mind's reflection is halted as a result of pain, sickness, and fear—for it is also a malady of the brain.

(62) How can one deem it unlikely for the two different directions of the soul's action to obstruct one another when multiplicity in the one direction may well necessitate mutual obstruction? For fright can make one forget pain, appetite [can make one forget] anger, reflection on one intelligible [can make one forget] reflection on another. An indication that the illness that comes upon the body does not affect the receptacle of cognitions lies in the fact that, when [the body] returns to health, [the person] does not need to start acquiring the sciences anew. Rather, the state of his soul returns as it had been, and the very same cognitions return without a [new] commencement of learning.

(63) [Our] objection [is to say]:

(64) The increase and decrease of powers has many causes that are innumerable. Thus, some powers may become stronger in early life, some in middle age, and some at the end, this applying to the mind as well. The only thing remaining [for the philosophers] is a claim for probability. There is nothing unlikely about smell and sight differing in that, after forty, smell becomes stronger and sight weaker, even though they are equal in being indwellers in a body. This is just as these powers differ in degree in animals, smell being stronger in some, hearing in some, and sight in some, due to differences in their bodily composition that cannot be ascertained. It is, hence, not improbable that the temperaments of organs should differ with respect to individuals and with respect to states. One of

the reasons for the weakening of sight before [the weakening of] mind could thus be that sight [comes] earlier [to the human]. For [the individual] sees when first created, whereas his mind is not fully developed before fifteen years or more, as is seen in the differences among people
 5 in [matters like] this. Thus, it has been said that the graying in the hair [of the head] precedes [the graying in] hair of the beard because the head's hair is earlier. Hence, when one plunges into these causes and does not reduce these things to the habitual courses [of nature], one cannot build on them knowledge which is reliable. [This is] because the
 10 modes of possible hypotheses regarding the increase or decrease of the faculties are innumerable. Nothing of this yields certainty.

A ninth proof

(65) They say:

(66) How could the human be [nothing but] the body with its accidents, when these [human] bodies continue to dissolve, nourishment replenishing what has been dissolved? [This is] so [much the case] that
 15 when we see a [newborn] boy separate from his mother, become frequently ill, then become fat and grow, we are able to say that after the age of forty none of the parts that existed at the age of separation remain. Rather, his first existence consists of parts of the sperm; but none of the
 20 parts of the sperm remain, all this having dissolved and been replaced by another. Thus, the body will be other than that [former] body. [Yet] we say that this human is that very [former] human, so that there remain with him cognitions from early boyhood, all his bodily parts having [nonetheless] been replaced. [This] proves that the self has an existence
 25 other than the body and that the body is its tool.¹⁸

(67) [Our] objection [to this is to say]:

(68) This is contradicted by the case of the beast and the tree when their state of old age is compared with their state of being young. For it is said that this is the very same [beast or tree] as it is said of the human, but this does not prove that [the former] have an existence other than the body. And what was mentioned regarding knowledge is refuted by the case of the retention of the forms of the imagination. For they remain from boyhood until old age, even if the rest of the parts of the brain have been replaced. Should they claim that the rest of the parts of the brain are not replaced, then the same would apply to the parts of the heart, both [heart and brain] being parts of the body. How, then, can it be imagined that all [the parts of the body] are replaced?

(69) On the contrary, we say: "Even if a human lived to be a hundred years old, for example, there would invariably remain in him parts of the [original] sperm. That these should be obliterated in him is certainly not the case.¹⁹ For he is that [same] human by virtue of what remains [of the sperm], just as it is said that this [tree] is that tree [at its younger age] and this [horse] that horse [at its younger age]. There would remain [something of the] sperm despite the abundance of dissolution and replacement."

(70) An example of this is when a pound of water is poured in a place, another pound then poured over it so that it mixes with it, then a pound is taken and another pound poured in, this being repeated a thousand times. At the last round, we will judge that something of the original water remains and that any pound taken from it would still have some of the original water.²⁰ This is because it existed in the second round [of adding and pouring], in the third round to a degree close to the second, in the fourth to a degree close to the third, and so on to the end. This, in terms of [the philosophers'] principles, becomes the more necessary a consequence, since they allow the division of bodies ad infinitum. Thus, the pouring of food into the body and the dissolution of the parts of the body is similar to pouring water into this vessel and scooping [water] out from it.

A tenth proof

(71) They say:

(72) The rational faculty apprehends the general intellectual universals which the theologians term "states." It thus apprehends the absolute human when the sense perceives a particular human individual,²¹ [the
5 former] being other than the perceived individual. For the perceived [human] is in a particular place [and] has a particular color, a particular measure, and a particular position, whereas the intellectually apprehended absolute human is stripped of these things. Rather, [absolute
10 man] includes everything that applies to the name "human," even if [absolute man] does not have the color of the perceived [individual], [or] his measure, position, and place; indeed, [absolute man] includes that whose existence in the future is possible—nay, even if man is annihilated, the reality of man remains in the mind denuded of all these
15 particulars. The same applies to all things which the senses perceive [as] individualized. From [the latter] there is achieved for the mind the reality of that individual as a universal stripped of materials and positions so that its descriptions are divided into what is essential for it, such as corporeality for trees and animals and animality for man, and what is accidental for it, such as whiteness and length to humans and trees.
20 [The mind] judges its being essential and accidental [as applied] to the human genus [and the genus] of trees and to all that is [intellectually] apprehended, not to the observed individual.

(73) This proves that the universal, abstracted from sensible concomitants, is intellectually apprehended [by man] and established in his
25 intellect. This universal, which is intellectually apprehended, is not [something] to which one points and has neither position nor measure. Hence, it is either the case that its abstraction from position and matter is [something] in relation to that from which [the universal] is grasped—which is impossible, because that from which it is grasped has position,
30 place, and measure—or in relation to that which grasps—namely, the rational soul. It must then be the case that the soul has no position, nothing to which one points, and no measures. Otherwise, should this be affirmed [of the soul], it would then have to be affirmed of [the universal] which indwells in it.

(74) [Our] objection [is to say]:

(75) The universal meaning which you [philosophers] have posited as indwelling in the mind is not conceded. Rather, only that which inheres in the senses inheres in the mind, except that it inheres in the senses as an aggregate which the sense is unable to separate, whereas the intellect is able to separate it. Then, once separated, the thing which is separated and singled out in the mind from its associates remains, in its being particular, similar to the thing conjoined with its associates. [The thing] established in the mind, however, has one and the same relation to the thing intellectually apprehended and the things similar to it. It is thus called "universal" in this sense—namely, that there is in the mind the form of the singled-out intelligible first apprehended by the senses, the relation of that form to the individual instances of that genus being one and the same.²² For, if [a person, for example, after seeing a human] sees another human, no new appearance will appear to him in the way [a new appearance would occur] if he sees a horse after seeing a human; for then there would occur to him two different forms.

(76) Something similar to this may happen in pure sensation. For when anyone sees water, there would occur in his imaginative faculty a form. If thereafter he sees blood, another form would then occur. If he were to see another [form of] water, another form would not come to be. Rather, the form of water [originally] imprinted in his imagination becomes a representative of each individual instance of water. It is thus thought to be a universal in this sense. Similarly, if he sees a hand, for example, there takes place in the imagination and the mind the position of its parts in relation to each other—namely, the spread of the palm, the division of the fingers in relation to it, the ending of the fingers with nails—and with this there takes place [in the imagination] its smallness, largeness, and color. If he sees another hand similar to it in all respects, no other form is renewed for him. Indeed, the second observation is not effective in producing anything new in the imagination. This is the same as when he sees consecutive instances of water in one vessel and of the same amount. He may see another hand differing in color and size [from the first], and consequently there would occur for him another color and size. A new form of the hand, however, will not occur. For the small black hand shares with the big white hand the position of the parts, but differs from

it in color and size. The form of what is equivalent to the first [hand] is not renewed, since that form is the very same as this form. It is the form of what is different from it that is renewed.

5 (77) This, then, is the meaning of the universal with respect to both the intellect and the senses. For when the mind apprehends from the animal the form of body, it does not acquire from trees a new form of corporeality, just as [it does not do this] in the imagination by apprehending the form of two [instances of water] at two [different] times, the same being the case with any two similar things. This does not allow for
10 the affirmation of a universal that has no position at all.

(78) The mind, however, may make the judgment affirming the existence of something which is not pointed at and which has no position, as when it makes the judgment that the creator of the world exists, but only from the standpoint that this is [an existent] whose subsistence in a body is inconceivable. In this division, however, that which is utterly set apart
15 from matter is the Intelligible in Himself, independently of²³ [a perceiving] intellect and an intellectual perceiver. But in the case of what is grasped from material things, its mode is as we have mentioned.